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AMBIVALENT LEGACY: A LEGAL HISTORY OF THE SOUTH. Edited
by David J. Bodenhamer and James W. Ely, Jr. Jackson, Miss.: University Press of Mississippi. 1984. Pp. x, 270. Cloth, $20; paper,
$8.95.
When most people consider southern legal history, they think only
of slavery and racial segregation and the legal issues that arose from
those two phenomena. Few would dispute, however, that the South is
a unique, albeit indistinctly defined, 1 region with a social, political,
and cultural structure unlike that of any other section of the United
States. Thus, it seems reasonable to suppose that the South has a legal
tradition of its own as well. Yet, as David J. Bodenhamer2 and James
W. Ely, Jr., 3 the editors of Ambivalent Legacy: A Legal History of the
South, point out, the legal history of the South has received little attention to date from scholars.4 Because only one region of the United
States - New England - has been the subject of intensive study and
research (p. vii), current interpretations of the legal history of the
United States are based on an insufficient foundation. As the editors
note, the development of a body of literature about the legal history of
the South, as well as other regions, would offer "a valuable counterpoint for the understanding of the development of an American legal
tradition" (p. vii).
1. As Ely and Bodenhamer point out:
The geographic borders of the South have always been imprecise. It is debatable whether
there was a distinct South before the sectional crisis that preceded the Civil War; certainly
that conflict did much to define our thinking about the area. A group of border states defies
easy sectional analysis. Moreover, there have been important divisions within the region.
The Tidewater counties of Virginia and South Carolina were settled communities when
Texas and Arkansas were frontier districts. The economy and society of the Upper South
were markedly dissimilar from those in the Lower South. Whites in the region were further
fragmented along class and regional lines.
Pp. 3-4.
2. Associate Professor of History at the University of Southern Mississippi. Professor
Bodenhamer is the author of several works on crime and criminal justice in pre-Civil 'war
America, including The Efficiency of Crimlnal Justice in the Antebellum South, 3 CRIM. JUST.
HIST. 81 (1983); and Law and Disorder in the Old South: The Situation in Georgia, 1830-1860, in
FROM THE OLD SOUTH TO THE NEW: EssAYS IN THE TRANSITIONAL SOUTH 109 (W. Fraser &
W. Moore eds. 1981).
3. Professor of Law at Vanderbilt University. Professor Ely's previous works on southern
legal history include THE CRISIS OF CONSERVATIVE VIRGINIA: THE BYRD ORGANIZATION
AND THE PoLmCS OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE (1976); Charleston's Court of Wardens, 1783-1900:
A Post-Revolutionary Experiment in Municipal Justice, 27 S.C. L. REv. 645 (1976); and American
Independence and the Law: A Study of Post-Revolutionary South Carolina Legislation, 26 VAND.
L. REV. 939 (1973).
4. P. vii. There have been numerous books, articles and symposia dealing with various aspects of southern legal tradition. See, e.g., Symposium: Legal History of the South, 32 VAND. L.
REV. 1 (1979). Bodenhamer and Ely provide an excellent bibliography of these sources. Pp.
257-64. As they note, however, "no work considers the broad legal development of the region."
P. 257.
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Ambivalent Legacy is an attempt to fill the void of scholarship on
southern legal history:. The book stems from a three-day Conference
on the Legal History of the South held jointly by the University of
Southern Mississippi and Vanderbilt University School of Law in February 1983. The editors compiled nine of the papers presented at the
conference into this one volume, hoping that the result would shed
light on "the relationship between southern law and the emergence of
the regional economy, the nature of bench and bar in the South, the
law of slavery and race in the southern past, and the impact of law on
southern politics and society" (p. viii). The essays, written by a diverse group of professors of history and law, 5 have been divided into
four categories: "Law and Southern History" (pp. 1-46); "Law and
the Southern Economy" (pp. 47-122); "Law and Race in Southern
History" (pp. 123-84); and "Southern Courts, Bench and Bar" (pp.
185-255).
The first essay, "Regionalism and the Legal History of the South"
(pp. 3-29), written by Ely and Bodenhamer themselves, establishes the
underlying premise of the book - that the South is a separate region
with a legal tradition distinct from that of the nation as a whole. Their
caveat that "[t]he entire notion of a unique, well-identified southern
region is suspect" (p. 3) is well-taken, however. Not only are the geographic borders of the South ill-defined, 6 but the laws of the southern
states themselves historically have been diverse:
Seaboard states, with their colonial past, clung tenaciously to traditional
legal concepts and were less open to innovations. While most of the
southern states adhered to English common law as the basis of their legal
system, Texas and Louisiana followed in large measure the civil law inherited from their French-Spanish ancestry. Consequently, slack generalizations about southern law must be viewed with caution. [p. 4]

Southern states adhered to many national legal norms as well:
"Southerners concurred with the central valu~s of American legal culture: resistance to arbitrary power, popular sovereignty, and protection of private property" (p. 4).
Nevertheless, the South's peculiar social structure did forge a
unique set of attitudes toward the law. Bodenhamer and Ely find that
"[a]mong the differences which define the southern legal heritage has
been an unusual degree of attention to matters of race and caste, a
rural culture, a hierarchical society, and a pervasive localism" (p. 4).
Ely and Bodenhamer examine these characteristics in the context of
five areas: slavery and the racial caste system, inhibition of commercial
development, personal status, the judicial system, and violence and
5. The following professors contributed to the book: James W. Ely, Jr., David J.
Bodenhamer, Lawrence M. Friedman, Tony A. Freyer, Harry N. Scheiber, John V. Orth, Philip
J. Schwarz, Thomas D. Morris, Mark V. Tushnet, Peter C. Hoffer, A.G. Roeber, and Kermit L.
Hall.
6. See note 1- supra.
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crime. Their brief sketch of the themes of southern legal history
presents the reader with the background necessary to place the topics
of the book's essays in their proper historical and social contexts. This
introduction provides the only broad view of southern legal history in
the entire book.
The diverse essays that follow it, though limited in scope, often
present interesting and untraditional viewpoints. For example, Professor Philip J. Schwarz' 7 essay, entitled "Forging the Shackles: The Development of Virginia's Criminal Code for Slaves" (pp. 125-46),
focuses not on the actions of the law and the courts, but rather on the
actions of the slaves themselves in perpetuating the institution of slavery. Schwarz argues that in creating a penal code for slaves,
lawmakers were reacting not merely to "the threat that some slaves
presented to slavery," but also to "the threat certain slaves presented
to life, limb, or property" (p. 126). Schwarz asserts that
[t]he white supremacist, pro-slavery ideology of the masters was not sufficient to cause the perpetuation of the slave code and courts over nearly
two centuries. The actions of a significant number of slaves - especially
as perceived by many white legislators and judges - also influenced the
creation and modification of the slave court system. [p. 126]

He argues that although most slave crimes are properly characterized
as "political behavior," i.e., as conscious resistance to slavery, some
originated "from self-interested motives, irrationality, or impulse"·(p.
127). Nevertheless, white authorities tended to perceive all slave
crimes as "political" in nature, and responded by strengthening the
laws that preserved the institution of slavery.
While Schwarz acknowledges the role that "white supremacist ideology" and the desire to preserve the institution of slavery played in
perpetuating and sustaining oppressive slave codes and courts (p. 139),
he argues that "[s]cholars need to complete their analysis of this process of legal development ... with a comparative explanation of how
the purposeful behavior of a significant number of rebellious slaves led
white authorities in Virginia and elsewhere to create and develop special statutes and institutions for slaves" (p. 139). He concludes that
"[i]ronically, even those slaves who acted irrationally or without any
intention of challenging slavery or the authorities of the slave society
of Virginia ended up threatening slavery as well as property or people"
(p. 139) and thus helped to create the laws designed to keep them in
their subjugated state.
In his essay entitled "Law and the Antebellum Southern Economy:
An Interpretation" (pp. 49-68), Professor Tony A. Freyer8 examines
the political economy of the antebellum South to determine "the degree to which 'slaveocracy interests' and democratic policies influ7. Associate Professor of History at Virginia Commonwealth University.
8. Associate Professor of History at the University of Alabama in Tuscaloosa.
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enced governmental politics [and] the extent to which these policies
differed from those fashioned outside the South" (p. 49). Freyer argues that although southern society was marked by great disparities in
both political power and wealth, "southern courts and legislatures
helped preserve social equilibrium through a proportionate distribution of goods and services from large propertied classes to small or
nonpropertied classes" (p. 50). Southern law recognized that in order
to preserve the power of the wealthy planters, divergent class interests
also had to be accommodated. Property law was the vehicle chosen to
accomplish this end (p. 63). Property rights were granted to small
property holders in return for their support of a slave regime that ultimately benefited the wealthiest and most powerful planters and
merchants. In addition, the law of eminent domain and women's
property rights encouraged the distribution of resources to less powerful interests. This redistribution of resources "did not diminish the
slaveholders' power as much as it sustained it by containing socialclass conflict, by fostering acceptance of the value of slavery as the
basis of wealth, and by encouraging interclass, socio-political association" (p. 64).
Though this accommodation did solidify the slavery system which
provided the basis of the southern economy, it did so at the cost of
economic development: "[C]onsiderations involving the preservation
of social and political stability were given priority over developmental
efficiencies associated with corporations" (p. 64). Thus, while in the
North the legal process served to foster corporate interests and economic development, "southern law served to maintain social equilibrium at the expense of economic development, which in no small
measure helped bring about a tragic Civil War" (p. 64).
The essays in Ambivalent Legacy are, in general, well-written, informative, and provocative. Yet the book as a whole does little to
define the southern legal tradition or to place the South's experience
into the broader picture of American law. Except for the editors' descriptive essay on the legal history of the South as a region (pp. 3-29),
the essays tend to be narrowly focused and parochial; note, for example, Professor A.G. Roeber's9 essay on the impact of German immigrants on the bar and judiciary of the colonial South (pp. 202-28), or
Professor Thomas D. Morris' 10 essay on the chattel mortgages of
slaves (pp. 147-70). Even those authors who do attempt to relate their
topics to a larger picture often fall short. For example, in his essay
"The Virginia State Debt and the Judicial Power of the United States,
1870-1920" (pp. 106-22), Professor John V. Orth 11 promises to show
how, "[i]n the course of [Virginia's post-war] legal battles [to repudiate
9. Assistant Professor of History at Lawrence University, Wisconsin.
10. Professor of History at Portland State University, Oregon.
11. Professor of Law at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
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its antebellum and Reconstructionist Era debt,] the United States
Supreme Court determined the nature of the judicial power of the
United States" (p. 106). What he actually provides, however, is a descriptive account of the lawsuits arising from Virginia's attempt to
evade its debt obligations. The reader is left to draw her own conclusions about the impact that these events had on shaping the judicial
power of the federal courts.
Upon completing the book, the reader is left feeling vaguely disappointed and unsatisfied - or, in a word, ambivalent. Though the essays individually have merit, the editors made no apparent attempt to
tie the essays together into a cohesive package. For example, Part III
on law and race in southern history contains essays by Professor
Schwarz on Virginia's criminal code for slaves, Professor Morris on
the law of chattel mortgages for slaves and Professor Mark V.
Tushnet 12 on the NAACP's experience in organizing civil rights litigation. While each of these essays is interesting and informative in its
own right, taken as a whole they do not provide a unified view of the
role of slavery and racial segregation in southern legal history.
To be fair, the editors admit that "[t]he essays in this volume do
not attempt to be comprehensive or definitive. The paucity of published work on southern law, and the vastness of the research which
remains to be done, dampens enthusiasm for such a project" (p. viii).
And indeed, these essays do make a valuable contribution to the scant
body of literature available on southern legal history. However, the
editors do not deliver what their title promised - a legal history of the
South. Bodenhamer and Ely complain in the Preface that
[a]lthough historians have not totally ignored the legal history of the
South, much of the existing work has been sporadic, uneven in quality,
and marked by traditional questions and techniques of investigation.
Many topics remain unexplored. More serious is the lack of central
themes to guide the investigation of southern legal history. [p. vii]

Unfortunately, they themselves have continued this poor tradition by
providing no unifying themes to guide their reader.
Bodenhamer and Ely assert that "an examination of southern law
and legal behavior offers an opportunity to locate important values of
the region, to gauge whether those values are traditional or modern,
and to discover the extent to which they parallel attitudes found in
other sections of the country" (p. vii). Ambivalent Legacy is not the
comprehensive and cohesive treatment of the southern legal tradition
needed to accomplish these laudable objectives. However, the book is
sure to "stimulate interest in the legal history of the South" (p. ix) and
12. Professor of Law at Georgetown University Law Center.
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so to provide an impetus for further research and exploration of that
region's unique legal structure.

- Lynda J. Oswald

